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HOW DEMOCRATIC ARE INITIATIVES?
RICHARD B. COLLINS*
Initiative, n., the right of a group of citizens to introduce a
matter for legislation directly to the voters by a petition
signed by a specified percentage of the voters.'
All significant amendments to the Colorado Constitution
since the 1930s have originated as ballot initiatives.2 Califor-
nia, Oregon, and several other states have similar histories.
This is a relatively recent change; the initiative right was sel-
dom used for many years after it became available.4 But in re-
Professor of Law, University of Colorado.
1. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 695 (3d ed. 1988) (paraphrased).
2. The assertion in the text is the author's opinion on the importance of
amendments. See COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30a (official English); art. II, § 301) (bar-
ring equality rights for gays); art. V, § 48 (Reapportionment Commission); art. V,
§ 50 (ban on public funding of most abortions); art. VI, §§ 20, 24, 25 (merit selec-
tion of judges); art. IX, § 17 (mandatory funding of public schools); art. X, § 20
(voters' approval required for increases in taxes, debt, or spending); art. XVIII, § 2
(state lottery); art. XVIII, § 9 (legalized gambling in three cities); art. XVIII, §§ 9,
11, 12, 12a (term limits); art. XXVI (ban on nuclear detonations); art. XXVII
(Great Outdoors Colorado support for wildlife, open space & recreation); fbrmer
art. X, § 20 & art. XI, § 10 (ban on public support for 1976 Winter Olympic Games
in Colorado).
The alternative ways to amend the Colorado Constitution are by a new conven-
tion, never used, and by amendments referred by the legislature for popular rati-
fication, which account for about seventy-one percent of adopted amendments and
sixty-three percent of amendments adopted since the initiative became available.
See COLO. CONST. art. XIX; percentages computed from data at: COMPILED L.
COLO. 1921 (prior to 1912); Dennis Polhill, Are Coloradans Fit to Make Their Own
Laws? A Common-Sense Primer on the Initiative Process, INDEPENDENCE
INSTITUTE (Oct. 24, 1996), available at http://i2i.org/SuptDocs/IssuPprs/ip0896.
htm; http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/elections/main.htm (last modified Sept. 20,
2001) (information provided by Colorado Secretary of State regarding recent state
election results).
3. See Hans A. Linde, Taking Oregon's Initiative Toward a New Century, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 391, 391-98 (1998); CALIFORNIA COMM'N ON CAMPAIGN FIN.,
DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE (1992); PHILIP L. DUBOIS & FLOYD FEENEY,
LAWMAKING BY INITIATIVE: ISSUES, OPTIONS AND COMPARISONS 30 (1998).
4. For example, the Colorado initiative right was first available in 1912 and
was avidly used that year and in 1914. Frequency then dropped sharply until the
1960s. See generally Initiative and Referendum Institute, at http:ll
www.iandrinstitute.org/ (last visited Sept. 20, 2001).
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cent decades, initiated constitutional amendments have stead-
ily increased in frequency and length, and have greatly outdis-
tanced statutory initiatives.'
Scholarly interest in initiatives has grown accordingly.
Legal scholars have been especially interested in judicial re-
view of initiatives that appear to target unpopular minorities,'
while political scientists have provided broader analyses and
proposals to improve political processes.7 Both have analyzed
in detail the many differences between initiatives and repre-
sentative democracy and have compared vices and virtues of
the two systems of lawmaking.
This paper has two principal objectives. First, it discusses
differences between initiatives and representative government
in relation to majority rule. It concludes that there are signifi-
cant differences, so that the degree to which direct majority
rule is desirable is crucial to appraisal of the initiative method
of lawmaking. Second, it discusses problems with initiative
processes and proposes possible remedies. The paper concludes
that most of the initiative's virtues are achieved when it is used
to enact statutes, while many of its shortcomings arise princi-
pally when it is used to amend state constitutions. Therefore,
it is desirable to make the initiative process easier for statutes
and more difficult for constitutional amendments.
5. For example, all Colorado amendments cited in note 2 were adopted after
1965. See sources cited supra note 2.
6. See Symposium, Voices of the People: Essays on Constitutional Democracy
in Memory of Professor Julian N. Eule, 45 UCLA L. REV. No. 6 (1998); Sympo-
sium, Redirected Democracy: An Evaluation of the Initiative Process, 34
WILLAMETTE L. REV. Nos. 3-4 (1998); Symposium, The Legitimacy of Direct De-
mocracy: Ballot Initiatives and the Law, 1996 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 371; Symposium,
The Bill of Rights vs. the Ballot Box: Constitutional Implications of Anti-Gay Bal-
lot Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1994); Lynn A. Baker, Direct Democracy and
Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 707 (1991);
Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 (1990);
Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54
WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978).
7. See ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY (1998); JAMES S. FISHKIN,
DEMOCRACY AND DELIBERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM
(1991); see also the recent book by my co-panelist, JOHN GASTIL, BY POPULAR
DEMAND: REVITALIZING REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY THROUGH DELIBERATIVE
ELECTIONS (2000).
[Vol.72
HOW DEMOCRATIC ARE INITIATIVES?
I. DEMOCRACY AND MAJORITY RULE
Canada had a national election on November 27, 2000,
that was quieter and cheaper than ours. All the votes were
counted without any lawsuits. In the election campaign,
Stockwell Day led the second strongest party and now heads
the opposition in Parliament. Mr. Day likes the initiative proc-
ess, and during the campaign, he advocated a national initia-
tive right for Canada. His proposal received a lot of attention.
On a televised political program, a journalist proposed the fol-
lowing initiative: "We demand that the government of Canada
force Stockwell Day to change his first name to Doris."' More
than a million signatures were quickly obtained on a petition to
do just that, more than enough to force a vote under Mr. Day's
proposal.9
This was an insightful way to highlight one of the prob-
lems with initiative lawmaking-its potential use against a
targeted minority fueled by dislike rather than substantive pol-
icy. On the other hand, initiatives have brought about many
useful reforms.1 °
Promoters of initiatives often preach that the initiative is
democracy; they claim that the adjective in direct democracy is
redundant or should be replaced by one that accentuates the
noun, such as true democracy. In his defense of Colorado's
anti-gay initiative, Justice Scalia called the initiative "the most
.democratic of procedures." 2 Ironically, Scalia's beloved Fram-
ers defined it the same way, but they disapproved. 3 So did de
Tocqueville.' 4
8. http://www.22minutes.com/featuredclip.php (last visited Sept. 20, 2001).
9. See id.
10. For Colorado, see supra note 2.
11. See http://philadelphiatwo.org/whatisdd.htm (last visited Aug. 23, 2001)
("true direct democracy exists nowhere in the United States" because legislatures
and courts regulate initiatives); Initiative and Referendum Institute, supra note 4.
12. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 647 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice
Scalia is less enthusiastic when initiators try to limit campaign contributions. See
Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 382, 410 (2000) (Tho-
mas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting). Nor is he supportive when they try to
legalize medical use of marijuana. See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buy-
ers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
13. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., .961).
[A] pure Democracy . . . can admit of no cure for the mischiefs of fac-
tion. A common passion or interest will, in almost every case, be felt by
a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from the
20011
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Some advocacy of majority rule is simply a continuation of
the ancient battle against rule by minority elites, which has no
serious modern defenders. Majority rule in some form is part
of all definitions of democracy. 5 But democracy's definitions
also invoke complex concepts of equality, such as "the principle
of equality of rights, opportunity, and treatment." 6 The ten-
sion between direct majority rule and political equality is a
central problem of political theory that informs appraisal of the
initiative method of lawmaking. Alternatives to direct democ-
racy are based on ultimate majority rule mediated by institu-
tions that try to give political minorities a fair voice.
Historically, the dominant form of popular government is
the model we associate with the British Parliament: voters
choose representatives from single-member, geographic dis-
tricts in elections won by local pluralities. This system modi-
fies direct majority rule in familiar ways. Geography is a di-
versifier, as is the custom that a plurality of votes carries a
district. As a result, coalitions are often necessary in legisla-
tures. In this country, we increased majority influence by in-
stituting popular election of a single executive. The 1913
form of Government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements
to sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is,
that such Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and con-
tention; have ever been found incompatible with personal security, or the
rights of property; and have in general been as short in their lives, as
they have been violent in their deaths. Theoretic politicians, who have
patronized this species of Government, have erroneously supposed, that
by reducing mankind to a perfect equality in their political rights, they
would, at the same time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their
possessions, their opinions, and their passions.
Id. at 61-62.
14. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 254-70 (Henry
Reeve text revised by Francis Bowen, Phillips Bradley ed., 1980).
15. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 34 (1956).
However, Dahl's own later work eliminated specific reference to majority rule in
his definition of democracy. See ROBERT A. DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 35-43 (1998).
Dahl's most detailed exploration of the relationship between democracy and ma-
jority rule is in ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 162 (1989) (con-
cluding that "the defects in majority rule are far too serious to be brushed aside
[but] all the alternatives to majority rules are also seriously flawed.").
16. WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY, supra note 1, at 366. See Frank I.
Michelman, "Protecting the People from Themselves," or How Direct Can Democ-
racy Be?, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1717 (1998).
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change to direct, statewide election of United States senators
significantly added to majority power.17
Initiatives short-circuit other structural devices that mod-
erate direct majority rule. The oldest is separation of powers.
Its ancient, first principle, to divide the power to make law
from the power to enforce it, enhances majority rule by subject-
ing rulers to the rules.'" This concept is fully consistent with
the initiative power presently in use, which is limited to legis-
lative actions. 9 The refinement of separation of powers into a
three-branch government with bicameralism, veto, and protec-
tions against retroactive laws developed in the eighteenth cen-
tury,20 and its most visionary proponent remains James Madi-
son. Madison's brilliant and familiar articulation of the
problem of the tyranny of the majority, and the separation of
powers doctrine as its solution remains unmatched.2' In the
twentieth century, powerful courts enforcing bills of rights and
rights statutes became a significant addition to Madison's
model.
A more recent structure designed to modify majority rule is
proportional representation ("PR"). PR modifies elections of
representatives so that more minority parties obtain seats in
legislatures.22 It has been tried in the United States only in lo-
cal governments (and usually discarded), but it is national pol-
icy in most European and Latin American countries, among
others, and is used to elect the European Parliament. 23 Swit-
17. See Todd J. Zywicki, Beyond the Shell and the Husk of History: The His-
tory of the Seventeenth Amendment and Its Implications for Current Reform Pro-
posals, 45 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 165 (1997); Terry Smith, Rediscovering the Sover-
eignty of the People: The Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1996).
18. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS,
23-82 (2d ed. 1998).
19. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1 (initiative right in legislative article);
ORE. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (same); Lane Transit Dist. v. Lane County, 957 P.2d 1217
(Ore. 1998) (no right of initiative to review administrative decision); City of Idaho
Springs v. Blackwell, 731 P.2d 1250 (Colo. 1987) (same); Arnel Dev. Co. v. City of
Costa Mesa, 620 P.2d 565 (1980) (same).
20. See VILE, supra note 18, at 83-106, 131-76.
21. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 13, Nos. 10 & 47-51.
22. PR refers to a number of related devices that achieve this purpose in dif-
ferent ways. See Center for Voting and Democracy at http://www.fairvote.org/
pr/intro.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2001).
23. See id.; Kathleen L. Barber, The True Experience of Proportional Repre-
sentation in American Cities, available at http://www.fairvote.org/library/history/
true-experiences.htm (last updated Aug. 23, 2000). There are a number of kinds
of weighted voting explained on the Fairvote website. For an account of PR in an
20011
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zerland has both initiatives and PR. To many Americans, PR's
most familiar use is in elections of the Israeli Knesset. PR is
advocated by academic writers to empower American racial
minorities,24 and the concept has been part of the debate in Su-
preme Court decisions on racial and political gerrymandering."
Federalism appears to straddle the debate, but as Madison
perceived, it essentially works against direct majority rule.2 6 It
protects states' authority to decide on their own political sys-
tems, and this allows the majoritarian initiative to flourish in
some. But its core purpose is to reduce the power of national
majorities reflected in Congress and the President, and states
invoke judicial authority against majoritarian federal power.
In sum, our traditional concept of representative govern-
ment is based on a complex set of institutions that mediate be-
tween direct and ultimate majority rule. As an open political
system, it is challenged to address its imperfections. In terms
of direct majority rule, proponents of initiatives want more; ad-
vocates of proportional representation, separation of powers,
states' rights, and judicial review want less. Some groups per-
ceive their self-interest in having more majoritarianism at the
state level and less at the federal or vice versa. All sides can
invoke a definition of democracy, so appeals to democracy beg
the question.
II. MINORITY INTERESTS IN REPRESENTATIVE AND INITIATIVE
LAWMAKING
Pierce v. Society of Sisters2 is the Brown v. Board of initia-
tive law.29 In 1922, Oregon voters amended the state's compul-
earlier era, see CLARENCE GILBERT HOAG & GEORGE HERVEY HALLETT, JR.,
PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION 275-91 (1926).
24. See LANI GUINIER, THE TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY: FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS IN REPRESENTATIVE DEMOCRACY (1994).
25. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 652 (1993); id. at 667 n.6, 674 (White,
J., dissenting); Davis v. Bandemer, 479 U.S. 109, 144-61 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
26. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 13, No. 51 at 351-53.
27. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Gregory v. Ashcroft,
501 U.S. 452 (1991).
28. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
29. See Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on the Role of Purpose in the Jurispru-
dence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997, 999 n.4 (1986) ("For a
generation, one criterion for an acceptable constitutional theory has been whether
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sory school attendance law to require all children between ages
six and sixteen to attend public schools or be home-schooled.
The measure was blatantly anti-Catholic, and the Supreme
Court struck it down. Like Brown, Pierce is now universally
considered correct, however debatable it might have been in its
day. Compare Pierce with Romer v. Evans,3" the Court's 1996
decision invalidating Colorado's blatantly anti-gay initiative.
Romer has strong critics,31 though perhaps when it, too, is over
seventy-nine years old, there will be general agreement that
the decision was right.
Apropos of Pierce and Brown, legal scholars' modern dis-
course about initiatives has focused on comparing how distinct
minorities fare under initiatives and under representative gov-
ernments. Analysis of judicial review under both has been
prominent;32 Julian Eule's article is the most widely cited.33
Eule and others argued that African Americans and other ra-
cial minorities fare less well under initiative lawmaking than
under representative legislatures, so that courts should
heighten the standards for judicial review of initiated laws.34
Critics of their thesis argued that superiority of representative
government was not proved.35 In any case, the critics claim
that theory explains why the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), was correct.").
30. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
31. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulturkampf: Supreme
Court Storytelling, the Culture War, and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
345 (1997). Compare Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923), which sustained a
California initiated measure that forbade Japanese farmers from owning land,
but would likely be invalid today.
32. See, e.g., Jack L. Landau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An
Assessment of Proposals to Apply Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34 WILLAMETTE
L. REV. 487 (1998); Mark Tushnet, Fear of Voting: Differential Standards of Judi-
cial Review in Direct Legislation, 1996 ANN. SURv. AM. L. 373; Philip P. Frickey,
Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, Direct Democracy, 1996
ANN. SURv. AM. L. 477; Baker, supra note 6; Eule, supra note 6; Bell, supra note 6.
33. See Eule, supra note 6; Symposium, Voices of the People: Essays on Con-
stitutional Democracy in Memory of Professor Julian N. Eule, supra note 6.
34. Eule, supra note 6, at 1548-86; Bell, supra note 6. See also Robin Char-
low, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the Problem with Plebiscites, 79
CORNELL L. REV. 527 (1994); Julian N. Eule, Representative Government: The
People's Choice, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 777 (1991).
35. See Kimberl Crenshaw & Gary Peller, The Contradictions of Main-
stream Constitutional Theory, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1683 (1998); Baker, supra note 6,
at 775-76. See also James Wenzel et al., Direct Democracy and Minorities:
Changing Attitudes about Minorities Targeted by Initiatives, in CITIZENS AS
LEGISLATORS: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES, 228-48 (Shaun Bowler
et al., eds. 1998); Clayton P. Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Ac-
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that heightened judicial review is not warranted, not feasible,
or both.36
The difficulty with this discourse is its binary limits. It
considers only the most prominent minority interests, and it
discusses their interests only in terms of advantageous and
disadvantageous legislation, ignoring any sort of compromise.
This allows the initiative to control the discourse because it is
binary in nature. Voters on initiatives choose yes or no. Each
initiated law generates relatively clear winners and losers.
Some of the most controversial initiatives are those such as
Oregon's in Pierce, Colorado's in Romer, and California's
Propositions 14 and 209,37 which appear to target the most
visible minority interests. However, these overt measures ac-
count for only a small proportion of initiated laws, allowing ini-
tiative proponents to wall them off as simply a problem for ju-
dicial review.3 ' This obscures important differences at the core
of the choice between representative government and initia-
tives and between different forms of the initiative power itself.
Scholars have analyzed many real and arguable differ-
ences between initiative and legislative lawmaking. They have
explained the initiative's clear superiority in overcoming legis-
lators' direct self-interest in reapportionment, term limits,
campaign finance, corruption opportunities, and legislators'
own salaries and perquisites of office.3 9 They have explored
such subjects as the influence of money, control of agenda-
setting, voter confusion, logrolling, representatives' voting in
the open versus secret voting on initiatives, intensity of prefer-
ences, efficiency of specialization in representative government,
and the effects of bicameralism and executive veto. 40 Legisla-
tion in Local Government Law, 86 MICH. L. REV. 930 (1986); Richard Briffault,
Distrust of Democracy, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347, 1364-66 (1985) (reviewing and criti-
cizing DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT
PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES).
36. See Baker, supra note 6, at 775; Tushnet, supra note 32.
37. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (Proposition 14, forbidding
fair housing laws); see also Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 963 (1997) (Proposition 209, forbidding affirma-
tive action).
38. See, e.g., Briffault, supra note 35, at 1364-65.
39. See Tushnet, supra note 32, at 377-78, 385-90.
40. See THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 21-59 (1989); DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT
LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 2-19, 27-
30, 106-21, 159-64, 180-99 (1984); RICHARD A. POSNER, BREAKING THE
[Vol.72
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tive deliberation has been a particularly popular subject of dis-
cussion and debate." Effects of the initiative on the geographic
diversity provided by traditional forms of representative gov-
ernment-specifically on representatives' services to their con-
stituents-have not been examined.
Shifting the focus to majority rule, some scholars argue
that there is little difference in the degree to which initiative
and representative governments reflect majoritarian prefer-
ences.42 That assumption seems quite wrong, but it is easy to
see why it is held when the focus of discussion is on discrimina-
tion against African Americans or gays. For highly visible
groups, there has often been persistent bias reflected in both
kinds of lawmaking. Yet even for these interests, prominent
scholars such as Derrick Bell think representative lawmaking
superior.43 And advocates of proportional representation surely
think their kind of legislatures better than direct democracy."
The most important way that representative legislatures
modify majority rule is by reflecting the intensity of minority
preferences.45 This is done systematically through political
parties, which have an incentive to broaden their bases to ac-
commodate different constituencies. In our predominantly two-
party system, the parties are coalitions of minority interests.
In proportional representation systems, they are less diverse,
and accommodations occur in parliamentary coalitions. On
particular issues in both systems, preferences are accommo-
dated ad hoc in the drafting and revision of bills. Of course
.DEADLOCK: THE 2000 ELECTION, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE COURTS 20-26
(2001); Tushnet, supra note 32, at 374-76, 379-92; Baker, supra note 6, at 715-
52; Eule, supra note 6, at 1522-30; Sherman J. Clark, A Populist Critique of Di-
rect Democracy, 112 HARV. L. REV. 434, 450-73 (1998).
41. See FISHKIN, supra note 7, at 35-53; Tushnet, supra note 32, at 379-83;
Charlow, supra note 34, at 535-36; Baker, supra note 6 at 736-52; Eule, supra
note 6, at 1520-21, 1526; Lawrence Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v.
Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REV.
1373, 1414-15 (1978).
42. See, e.g., CRONIN, supra note 40, at 229; Briffault, supra note 35, at
1364-66.
43. See Bell, supra note 6; see also William E. Adams, Jr., Is It Animus or a
Difference of Opinion?: The Problems Caused by the Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay
Ballot Measures, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 449 (1998); John C. Brittain, Direct De-
mocracy by the Majority Can Jeopardize the Civil Rights of Minority or Other
Powerless Groups, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 441.
44. See GUINIER, supra note 24, at 1-20. Guinier did not discuss initiatives,
but she attacked unmodified majority rule.
45. See MAGLEBY, supra note 40, at 180-85; Clark, supra note 40, at 450-73.
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within a legislature, some of this activity is classified as logroll-
ing or vote trading and has a bad name because at times it has
meant one corrupt vote traded for another.46 The criticism is
overdone; this sort of bargaining for votes is crucial to empow-
ering minority voices."
Americans should reflect on why many countries have
maintained reasonable accommodations for minority rights and
interests under systems of parliamentary supremacy that lack
a bill of rights backed by judicial review. Place yourself in a
shunned minority by assuming you are poor and accused of fel-
ony. Would you rather be tried by the courts of Texas, disci-
plined by state and federal bills of rights and the world's most
powerful appellate judiciary, or by those of Australia, subject to
neither? You might say Texas, but the choice would not be as
easy as American political mythology suggests.
48
Initiative lawmaking is not readily adaptable to coalition
politics. Indeed, in many respects it is their antithesis. Most
initiative proponents are relatively small groups who generate
their proposals privately. They must, of course, gather many
thousands of signatures and win a general vote, but they
mostly accomplish this based on reactions against coalition
politics and minority interests. They tap resentment against
the legislature and appeal to majoritarian positions that legis-
lative coalitions have suppressed. When resentment is caused
by self-interest of legislators, as in reapportionment, corrup-
tion, and the like, the minority interest is the political class
themselves, and the initiative does noble work. But in many
other cases, the resentment is against minority interests of
citizens. This has generated the cant phrase "special interests,"
now invoked by every interest group against every other. We
are most likely to notice when racial or similar minority groups
are affected, but the concept is far broader. Coalition politics
involve every interest in society: farmers, greens, unions, gun
enthusiasts, polluters, insurance companies, churches, miners,
dog owners, universities, and so on. We are all special.
Another inspiration for initiatives is resentment against
anti-majoritarian judicial decisions. In 1912, Colorado voters
46. See COLO. CONST. art. V, § 40 (purporting to ban log-rolling, though
never enforced); Tushnet, supra note 32, at 383-85.
47. See Clark, supra note 40, at 456-63; Michael J. Waggoner, Log-Rolling
and Judicial Review, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 33, 36 (1980).
48. See DAHL, supra note 15, at 187-91.
[Vol.72
HOW DEMOCRATIC ARE INITIATIVES?
adopted an initiated amendment to the state constitution to
forbid all state courts except the Colorado Supreme Court from
holding any state law unconstitutional and to empower voters
by petition to force a reviewing vote when the Supreme Court
did so." The Supreme Court had to stretch the federal Consti-
tution to put down the populist rebellion against its authority."
Initiatives driven by judicial decisions have become muted
as the modern dominance of federal courts has placed decisions
beyond initiators' reach, although anti-court politics fuel calls
for a national right of initiative. 1 John Brittain noted that the
Connecticut Supreme Court's decision, respecting Hartford
schools would probably have been overturned in an initiative
state. 2 And an initiative disabled California courts from rec-
ognizing any rights of criminal defendants not compelled by
federal law. 3 Here again, relevant minority interests are much
broader than groups intended by use of the term minority in
popular discourse. Courts have applied the notion that restric-
tions on personal liberty and property must be reasonable to
protect a broad array of minority interests, such as those in
family life, procreation, abortion, condominium owners against
covenants, landowners against zoning, group homes, and many
others."
Initiatives are also well suited to reflect majoritarian posi-
tions of society's better off. The economic position of voters who
participate gives these propositions an automatic head start.
By limiting property tax increases unless property is sold, Cali-
fornia's Proposition 13 favored property owners over others and
49. See 1913 Colo. Laws 678, amending COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (repealed).
50. See People v. Max, 198 P. 150 (Colo. 1921); People v. Western Union Tel.
Co., 198 P. 146 (Colo. 1921).
51. See The National Initiative For Democracy, at http://philadelphiatwo.
org/ni.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2001); COLO. CONST. art. XVIII, §§ 12, 12a (in-
structions to members of Congress on term limits in reaction to U.S. Term Limits
v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (cf, Morrissey v. State, 951 P.2d 911 (Colo. 1998)
(holding both sections to be unconstitutional)); Craig B. Holman & Robert Stern,
Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives: The Changing Role of State and Federal
Courts, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1239, 1263-64 (1998) (backlash against courts shift-
ing its focus to federal courts).
52. See Brittain, supra note 43, at 448-49, regarding Sheff v. O'Neill, 678
A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996) (de facto segregation of Hartford schools violated state
constitution).
53. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Calif. 1990) (sustaining Propo-
sition 115, the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act).
54. See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ch.
11 (6th ed. 2000).
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prior property owners over later ones.5" Other anti-tax initia-
tives have similar purposes and effects. Colorado's prohibits
progressive income taxes.56 Oregon's new "taking" initiative
favors property owners, particularly those with large hold-
ings. 7 Rent control, anti-growth, and downzoning initiatives
favor present residents over immigrants. Even pro-gambling
initiatives, which reflect a mix of voter motivations, have re-
gressive effects because lower-income folks spend more of their
income on gambling. As the cost of initiatives has risen, the
tendency to reflect interests of society's wealthier half has in-
creased.5"
On the other hand, self-interested lawmaking by initiative
at least requires the broad support of a majority of those who
vote on a measure. The special rent-seeking deals and back-
room corruption that mar some representative lawmaking are
avoided.59 In this context, majority rule is superior.
In sum, the dominant effect of initiative rights is to in-
crease the directness of majority rule and to eliminate meas-
ures of relative preferences.6 ° Representative government can
be described as weighted majority rule, initiatives as the oppo-
site. This is not an indictment of initiatives; on any list of ma-
joritarian positions, each of us will find some to love, some to
hate, and many to shrug off. But distrust of the process by
groups such as African Americans and gays, that are minorities
on a broad range of issues, is a sensible perception of how ini-
tiatives work.
III. INITIATIVES' PROBLEMS AND REMEDIES
Virtues of the initiative right are obvious and important.
Initiatives directly empower citizens. They overcome the self-
interest of legislators and reduce corruption. Final proposals
55. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE
LOST (1998).
56. COLO. CONST. art. X, § 20(8)(a).
57. See ORE. CONST. art. I, § 18(a)-(f), available at http://www.leg.state.
or.us/orcons/orcons.html. A legal challenge against the initiative is pending.
58. See DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE CAMPAIGNS
AND THE POWER OF MONEY 163-97 (2000).
59. See DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS: THE BALLOT INITIATIVE
REVOLUTION 1-25 (1989); Tushnet, supra note 32, at 383-85.
60. But see Gillette, supra note 35, at 968-69 (1988) (initiatives show rela-
tive preferences because uninterested voters do not participate).
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are more publicly debated than legislative bills. Initiatives
bask in the "mythic idea" of popular sovereignty and in the
bedrock principle of consent of the governed.61
The right of initiative is enormously popular, and a num-
ber of admirable reforms have been brought about by the ini-
tiative process. Of course, an important reason initiatives are
popular is their effective implementation of direct majority
will, reflected in familiar political invocations of the silent ma-
jority and the moral majority. When and whether majoritari-
anism is a virtue are discussed in the previous parts of this pa-
per. But even if initiatives disadvantage minority interests vis-
A-vis representative governments, there is almost no chance
that American use of initiatives will decline. Rather, the pres-
sures are to broaden their reach to other states and to make
them easier in states that have them. Ease of voting by elec-
tronic means, early voting, and mail ballots are touted as rea-
sons to relax restrictions and extend use. Determined groups
are bent on a national initiative right.62 For these reasons, it is
important to explore initiatives' shortcomings and possible
cures.
A. Drafting and Amending
Problems with drafting initiatives have been widely dis-
cussed.63 Most legislatures employ professional drafting staffs,
but many initiatives are amateur efforts done in private by ar-
dent proponents with no critical counsel. Initiators make little
effort to consider possible unforeseen consequences or to fit
their measures into the body of preexisting law. Voter confu-
sion is a frequent concern, and initiators are accused of bun-
dling attractive issues with others that could not win alone.'
61. See Frank I. Michelman, Always Under Law?, 12 CONST. COMMENT.
227, 231 (1995).
62. The most prominent group is former Senator Mike Gravel's Philadelphia
II. See Philidelphia II: Direct Democracy, at http://philadelphiatwo.org (Aug. 18,
2001). For examples of movements to extend the initiative to other states, see Ini-
tiative for Texas, http://www.initiativefortexas.org (n.d.); http://www.simshome.
com/iandr (n.d.) (Delaware).
63. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 3, at 113-18; see also Richard B.
Collins & Dale Oesterle, Structuring the Ballot Initiative: Procedures That Do and
Don't Work, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 47, 76-84 (1995); Eule, supra note 6, at 151.6.
64. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 3, at 118-52; Collins & Oesterle, su-
pra note 63, at 84-91.
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Of course, bundling is also a curse of Congress and of some
state legislatures.65 Bundling is sometimes defended as a
means to aid minority voices,66 but its actual uses appear ori-
ented toward rent-seeking favoritism for minorities who should
not be protected, such as oil drillers.
Professional consultants are now hired to draft some ini-
tiatives, and focus groups are used to improve their efforts.67
But this increases the cost, contributing to the high threshold
that confines the process to well-financed interests.
Most American initiative procedures lock up the text early
in the process, before any petitions have been signed. Errors
are frozen. Because most initiatives can be amended only by
another referendum, an enacted error is difficult to correct.6"
A minor remedy used in a number of initiative states is to
require initiative drafts to be submitted to the state's legisla-
tive staff for review and comments. That review is, of course,
not binding on initiators.69 A remedy for bundling is a single-
subject rule, although this generates its own problems. Such
rules present difficult judgments for reviewing authorities and
can either unduly restrict the initiative right or become tooth-
less conduits for most initiatives." A possible answer is to al-
low multiple-part initiatives to be placed on the ballot so that
voters can choose separately among discrete parts. However,
this would make the process even more complex and could, like
special jury verdicts, produce inconsistent votes.
The most comprehensive response to drafting and amend-
ing problems is the indirect initiative, used in Switzerland-
the device's ancestral home-and in a few American states,
such as Massachusetts and Mississippi.71 Proposed initiatives,
65. See L. Gordon Crovitz, The Line-Item Veto: The Best Response When
Congress Passes One Spending "Bill"a Year, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 43 (1991).
66. See Clark, supra note 40, at 463-67.
67. See BRODER, supra note 58, at 70-83.
68. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 3, at 116-17; Collins & Oesterle, su-
pra note 63, at 78. On amendment after enactment, see infra, text at notes 71-74.
69. E.g., COLO. CONST. art. V, § 1(5).
70. Compare Clark, supra note 40, at 467-69 (California rule weak), with
cases entitled In re Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, and Summary for
1999-2000, 977 P.2d 845, 849, 853, 856 (Colo. 1999), and cases entitled Matter of
Title, Ballot Title and Submission Clause, Summary for 1997-98, 960 P.2d 648,
1192, 1204 (Colo. 1998) (Colorado rule fairly strict).
71. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 3, at 35-37, 46-50, 85-91; KRIS W.
KOBACH, THE REFERENDUM: DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN SWITZERLAND 1-30, 87, 110
(1993).
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either based on preliminary petition drives or some other
threshold showing, must go before the legislature, which must
hold hearings. The legislature can adopt the measure itself,
suggest changes that a designated committee of initiators is
empowered to accept, then adopt the amended measure or put
it on the ballot.72 The legislature can also place a competing
measure on the ballot, giving voters an alternative that is usu-
ally more moderate or that takes apart a bundled measure.73
In Switzerland, most laws adopted by referendum are modifica-
tions of or substitutes for the initiators' original proposal.74
B. Long Ballots
Initiative enthusiasts claim that having the right of initia-
tive increases voter turnout and thus promotes civic involve-
ment.75  However, studies refute this claim.76  Moreover, the
claim ignores the degree to which voters in initiative states
show up and vote for candidates but decline to vote on some or
all of the initiatives, so-called voter drop-off.77 One cause is
that as state and local initiatives proliferate, the number on a
given ballot can become quite large.7" For conventional voting,
longer waits at polling stations are more frequent. This dis-
courages voting, and dropouts are likely to be less educated and
less well off. Even for those who vote, the likelihood of under-
standing every initiative diminishes. If one had been optimis-
tic on this question, the Florida election information about
voter confusion on the simple question of presidential balloting
should be a stiff antidote. So far there has been no reported in-
stance of deliberate flooding of the ballot, but it is a theoretical
possibility. To look at the problem another way, note that such
a far-reaching constitutional change as California's Proposition
72. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 3, at 35-37, 49-50; KOBACH, supra
note 71, at 87, 100.
73. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 3 at 49-50. The same is true in
states that have the indirect initiative. Id. at 36-37.
74. See id. at 52.
75. See Initiative and Referendum Institute, supra note 4.
76. See MAGLEBY, supra note 40, at 95-98.
77. Id. at 90-95.
78. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 3, at 153-63; SECRETARY OF STATE OF
OREGON, 1996 GENERAL ELECTION VOTERS' PAMPHLET (247 pages issued in two
volumes). For a general argument that representative democracy is more efficient
than direct, see POSNER, supra note 40.
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13 was approved by only 26.9% of the state's adult residents.79
The problem has been eased somewhat by greater use of absen-
tee ballots, early voting, and in Oregon, voting entirely by mail.
Initiative proponents tout electronic means as an answer.
They want to allow Internet voting and petitioning. Their uto-
pia is a world where popular consent is sought for every legisla-
tive proposal, whether originated by government or citizens.8 °
C. Money
The original proponents of initiative lawmaking touted it
as a corrective for what they believed was corruption of legisla-
tures by money."1 They would be appalled to find that money
now has at least as much involvement in the initiative process
as the legislative. According to David Broder, more money is
now spent on statewide California initiatives than on state leg-
islative campaigns. 82 The reasons are apparent: most initia-
tives require a lot of money to get on the ballot, before a dime
has been spent on the referendum itself,83 and initiative cam-
paigns are statewide, in contrast to races local to legislative
districts. As a result, the agenda for use of the initiative right
is set by those who can raise a sufficient war chest to pay peti-
tion circulators and other expenses of qualifying for the ballot.'
Proponents of electronic voting offer Internet petitioning as a
way to reduce the cost of ballot access. 5 This seems promising,
but concern about possible manipulation calls for caution.
Once a measure is on the ballot, initiatives become part of
the general debate about campaign spending limits, including
its First Amendment dimension. 6 For initiatives, the justify-
ing purpose of avoiding the corruption of politicians by large
79. See Collins & Oesterle, supra note 63, at 52 n.18.
80. See Initiative and Referendum Institute, supra note 4; see also http:ll
www.vote.org/streamline (n.d.).
81. See CRONIN, supra note 40, at 53-57.
82. See BRODER, supra note 58, at 163-64.
83. Id. at 55-83, 163-97.
84. On the significance of agenda control, see William H. Riker, Comment on
Baker, Direct Democracy and Discrimination: A Public Choice Perspective, 67
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 791 (1991).
85. See http://www.vote.org/streamline (n.d.).
86. See Richard Briffault, Ballot Propositions and Campaign Finance Re-
form, 1996 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 413, 418-19, 439-40 (First Amendment rule
stricter for initiatives than for candidates).
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contributions is weakened or eliminated." Moreover, statewide
votes on initiatives, like those for United States senators, in-
volve much greater challenges to organize and raise large cam-
paign funds than do local legislative races.8" All these methods
contrast sharply with the New Hampshire system of small leg-
islative districts in which the cost of each campaign is modest.8 9
On the other hand, making initiatives less expensive would
increase the power of direct majority rule. At present, the
large cost of initiatives limits their statewide use to measures
with substantial backing. If every question could be put to a
referendum at little cost, the initiative and referendum could
become the primary means of making legislative choices.
Weighted minority opinions would disappear.
D. Judicial Review
Courts are the sole check on initiatives, which puts great
pressures on judges. It starts with dissembling; judicial opin-
ions gush over the sacredness of popular sovereignty reflected
in the initiative right.9" Yet the rate of invalidation is much
greater for initiatives than for ordinary legislation.9' This gen-
erates political efforts to muzzle the courts, such as the bill
sponsored by the late Representative Sonny Bono,9 and state
proposals to impose short judicial terms and term limits.9
87. See James P. Raskin, Direct Democracy, Corporate Power and Judicial
Review of Popularly-Enacted Campaign Finance Reform, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L.
393.
88. See Smith, supra note 17, at 65-66 (cost of running for Senate).
89. The New Hampshire lower house has 400 members elected from 195 dis-
tricts for a state population of about 1.2 million, so each district has a small popu-
lation, easily reachable without large media expenses. See N. H. CONST. pt. 2, art.
9; N. H. RSA 662:5; http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tabO2.txt (Dec. 28,
2000) (2000 New Hampshire population reported as 1,235,786).
90. See, e.g., Kenneth P. Miller, The Role of Courts in the Initiative Process:
A Search for Standards (paper for 1999 Annual Meeting of American Political Sci-
ence Ass'n, available at http://www.iandrinstitute.org) at 5-6; Evans v. Romer,
854 P.2d 1270, 1286 (Colo. 1993), affd on other grounds, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)
("That Amendment 2 was passed by a majority of voters through the initiative
process as an expression of popular will mandates great deference."); Equality
Found. of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 297 (6th Cir.
1997), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 943 (1998) ("direct franchise.., entitled to the high-
est degree of deference from the courts.").
91. See Miller, supra note 90, at 3, 30.
92. H.R. 1170, 104th Cong. (1995). See Holman & Stern, supra note 51, at
1264 (favoring Bono's proposal).
93. See, e.g., Aisenberg v. Campbell, 975 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1999).
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State judges must face the electorate in regular, retention, or
recall elections. 4 Some judges find it difficult to stand up to
the argument that an initiative is the will of the people."
Most initiative states have made the petitioning process
the same to amend the state constitution as to enact a statute.
Initiators tend to be ardent and impatient, so they much prefer
the constitutional route. Indeed, in some states, they have
made nominally statutory initiatives quasi-constitutional by
disabling the legislature from amending them. 6 This has
negative practical consequences when initiative measures in-
clude errors or significant unintended consequences that a leg-
islature would amend if they arose in ordinary legislation.
Courts feel pressures for imaginative efforts at interpretation. 7
When initiators amend a state constitution, they disable
any constitutional restraints under that constitution. State
bills of rights are bypassed. State courts have no state-law ba-
sis to address constitutional issues other than their authority
to interpret the initiative. The latter power is important and
will meet many needs,9" but it is plainly inadequate to address
many others. This puts added pressure on federal constitu-
tional norms, nationalizing still more individual rights issues.
The "federalist" approach taken by the Supreme Court in San
Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez is blocked.99
One remedy for the latter problem was found by the draft-
ers of Mississippi's initiative power. Initiatives may be used to
amend any part of the Mississippi Constitution except its bill of
rights and the initiative provision itself. 100 Rights review at
the state level is preserved, keeping more issues within the
94. See Eule, supra note 6, at 1579-84.
95. See id.; cf., Holman & Stern, supra note 51, at 1249 (arguing that state
and federal courts apply different standards in reviewing initiatives).
96. See DUBOIS & FEENEY, supra note 3, at 78-81.
97. See, e.g., Interrogatories on S.B. 93-94, 852 P.2d 1, 4-11 (Colo. 1993).
98. See Frickey, supra note 32. On the problem of interpreting legislative
intent of initiated laws, see Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of "Popular Intent": In-
terpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995).
99. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), held that
disparities in school district funding among Texas districts did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment. But the Supreme Court of Texas then held that the sys-
tem violated the state constitution. See Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777
S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989). Other states have similar decisions requiring school fund-
ing equalization. See Paula J. Lundberg, State Courts and School Funding: A
Fifty-State Analysis, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1101 (2000).
100. MISS. CONST. art. 15, § 273(5)(a), (d).
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state's legal system. Were we to have a national right of initi-
ated constitutional amendments, Mississippi's solution would
become a very important model.
E. Statutory Initiatives
Most of the virtues of initiated lawmaking are achieved by
statutory initiatives, and most of the problems are much more
severe for constitutional initiatives. The distinction is in-
creased by intergenerational differences. Yesterday's constitu-
tional initiative may have entrenched a rule that today's citi-
zens would not approve, but the difficulty of amendment has
powerful inertial effects." 1 (Of course, this problem applies as
well to constitutional rules adopted by other means.)
For these reasons, an important remedy is to make initia-
tives amending state constitutions significantly more difficult
to accomplish than those enacting state statutes. This is hard
to achieve in states where amendments are already easy, both
because initiative proponents will resist and because it poses
difficult problems about amending previously initiated meas-
ures. 102 But it should be considered by states contemplating
addition of the initiative right and in any formulation of a na-
tional right. One measure that would accord greater dignity to
constitutions would be a requirement that an initiated change
be approved twice in separate elections. Another is to use the
indirect initiative for constitutional amendments but retain a
direct procedure for statutes.
There are two basic differences between statutory and con-
stitutional initiatives. In all states, a statute is subject to the
state constitution, so that minority rights can be addressed un-
der the state bill of rights. This process is healthier for federal-
ism than exclusive reliance on federal rights. The Mississippi
Constitution largely achieved this goal by placing its bill of
rights out of reach of initiated amendments.0 3 But statutory
initiatives are subject to the entirety of a state constitution,
101. See Michael J. Klarman, Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrench-
ment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491 (1997).
102. A proposal to require sixty percent of votes cast to amend the Colorado
Constitution but to continue the simple majority rule for initiated statutes, and to
limit the general assembly's power to amend the latter, was voted down in 1996.
See 1995 Colo. Laws 1422.
103. See supra text accompanying note 100.
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and at times standards outside the bill of rights will be impor-
tant.
The second difference is the possibility that an initiated
statute can be amended by the legislature. Rules on this ques-
tion vary considerably. In some states, such as Colorado, an
initiated statute can be amended by ordinary legislation. °4 In
others, such as Arkansas, initiated statutes can be amended
only by a super-majority vote of the state legislature. 1 5 And in
California, an initiated statute can be amended only by another
referendum. 106 As stated above, the latter system makes initi-
ated statutes quasi-constitutional, retaining the procedural dif-
ficulties of constitutional initiatives.
To allow mistakes and unforeseen consequences to be cor-
rected, and laws to be integrated, the legislature ought to be
able to amend initiated statutes. But to protect the hard-won
achievement of initiators, amendment should not be easy. Of
course, the fact of a favorable popular vote will have an in ter-
rorem effect on the legislature. The best solution is to allow
amendment only by a super-majority of the legislature, such as
two-thirds. Another solution occasionally mentioned is to limit
the legislature to amendments that do not repeal or alter the
basic purpose of an initiative. However, this rule seems likely
to generate complex and expensive litigation.
CONCLUSION
The initiative's claim to be more democratic than represen-
tative government has much to do with its popularity. How-
ever, the claim depends on how one defines democracy in light
of the interests of minorities (of every sort) who lose referen-
dums. Traditional representative democracy better reflects the
intensity of minority preferences, so it has a claim to achieve
superior accommodations of social interests. Yet the initiative
overcomes important defects in the practice of representative
democracy arising from the self-interest of lawmakers. Be-
cause of the initiative's popularity, practical issues of public
104. See In re Sen. Res. No. 4, 130 P. 333 (Colo. 1913).
105. ARK. CONST. amend. 7.
106. CALIF. CONST. art. 2, § 10(c). Arizona is nearly as strict. The legisla-
ture can make only technical amendments, and these require a three-quarter ma-
jority vote. See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, § 6(B), (C). See BRODER, supra note 58, at
195-96.
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policy are likely to arise most frequently in shaping procedures
for initiatives. Decisions on these questions should take into
account effects of accentuated, direct majority rule and prob-
lems related to drafting and amending initiatives, ballot
length, and judicial review. Initiated constitutional amend-
ments give rise to much more serious problems than do statu-
tory initiatives. Adopting quicker and simpler procedures for
statutory initiatives, and the indirect initiative and other safe-
guards for constitutional changes, would achieve a desirable
balance between direct and representative democracy.
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